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Introduction
As the debate over climate change legislation brewed
in the US House and Senate in 2009 and early 2010,
its implications for heavily traded manufacturing were
hotly contested. Concerned that higher energy prices
would cause firms to produce these goods outside the
United States instead of complying with US regula-
tions, lawmakers offered free emissions allowances to
compensate domestic firms and threatened to require
importers from countries that did not meet US cli-
mate standards to purchase emissions allowances at
the border.
A year later, passage of US climate legislation now
seems all but impossible. As the United States has
backed away from its initial ambitions, North
America as a whole seems likely to follow suit. Aside
from anemic federal regulation under the US Clean
Air Act, climate change legislation has been left up to
states and provinces for the time being. 
The fragmentation of climate change policy has its
own implications for North American trade and
investment. Though the scale is now far smaller, regu-
lation at the provincial level makes it more likely that
emissions could migrate to other areas. States and
provinces also have less capacity to adjust their trans-
mission infrastructure to ramp up renewable electrici-
ty production at least cost. This does not mean that
state and provincial policy is not crucial to North
America’s climate change mitigation goals – for now,
it seems that state policy is the only feasible means of
working toward climate change mitigation in North
America. However, this is not the best possible situa-
tion. Federal climate policy, though jettisoned due to
concerns about jobs and competitiveness, would actu-
ally be more effective at reducing emissions without
adverse trade impacts.
The volume of North American energy trade is large.
The United States derives about a fifth of its oil from
Canada, and in 2008 about two thirds of the crude oil
produced in Canada was shipped to the United
States.1 Canada is the largest supplier by far of ener-
gy-intensive manufactures to the United States,
including steel (20 percent of US imports), cement
(53 percent of US imports), paper (52 percent of US
imports), and aluminum (55 percent of US imports).
In total, Canada exported USD 44 billion of highly
traded, energy-intensive products to the United States
in 2008 (Hufbauer and Kim 2009).2
As a consequence, it is important to understand
what state legislation means for trade in energy and
energy-intensive goods. This paper explores this
issue below.
Prospects for North American action
Federal
Prospects for comprehensive federal climate change
legislation in North America are not bright. Though
the United States seemed promising in 2009, with the
passage of the Waxman-Markey bill through the
House of Representatives, legislation stalled in the
Senate in 2010 as partisan acrimony intensified and
the political mood soured on cap-and-trade. To cap it
off, the Democratic Party, which is far more support-
ive of climate change legislation, experienced heavy
losses in Congressional midterm elections. There is lit-
tle likelihood in the near future that Republicans in
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Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman bills.the House and the Senate will rally around a key
Obama initiative that most of them campaigned
against. Even initiatives such as a renewable portfolio
standard that once seemed politically safe now seem
less likely.
Environmental advocates have turned to new chan-
nels. One of the chief tools in the Obama
Administration’s arsenal is the Clean Air Act, which is
administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that
the EPA had the authority to regulate greenhouse
gases (GHGs), which cause climate change, under the
Act.3 Technically, the EPA could achieve substantial
GHG emissions reductions through this approach
(Bianco and Litz 2010) – but this would involve imple-
menting a much more far-reaching regime than
Congress is likely to allow. Already, a number of res-
olutions have been introduced in Congress to limit the
EPA’s powers. These measures have so far been kept at
bay, but the incoming Congress promises to be even
less sympathetic to the EPA than before.
So far, EPA regulation has been modest. The EPA has
announced that it will require new sources and major
modifications producing more than 75,000 tons of
CO2e per year – in other words, new projects that
would produce a large amount of emissions – to obtain
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits.
The PSD permitting system is administered on a state-
by-state basis. In November 2010, the EPA released its
proposed guidance to the states for PSD permitting.
The document indicates that a relatively lenient
approach will be taken toward coal-fired power plants,
relative to the possibilities. Energy efficiency improve-
ments are on the table, but the guidance document dis-
courages states from requiring coal-fired power plants
to switch to coal or biomass or implement carbon cap-
ture and sequestration.4  These energy efficiency
improvements are not expected to produce substantial
emissions reductions; Richardson et al. (2010) estimate
that modest energy efficiency improvements in coal
plants could reduce GHG emissions by 3 percent. 
If the United States is not able to pull together a pro-
gram to substantially reduce GHGs, Canada is
unlikely to do so either. Over the past couple of years,
the Canadian government has transitioned from at
least a nominal policy-maker on climate change to a
taker of policy from the United States. In 2007, the
Canadian government released Turning the Corner, a
relatively ambitious plan that aimed to reduce emis-
sions by 20 percent from 2006 levels by 2020.
Subsequently, citing fears of lost industrial competi-
tiveness, it has backed away from this plan and instead
promised to emulate whatever the US action turned
out to be. By early 2010, Canada had shifted so far
toward this stance that its Copenhagen pledge read,
“17 percent, to be aligned with the final economy-
wide emissions target of enacted US legislation”
(UNFCCC 2010a).
The host of the 2010 COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico has
shown international leadership on climate change. At
the 14th session of the UNFCCC Conference of
Parties (COP 14) in Poznan, Poland in December
2008, it announced its intention to reduce emissions
50 percent from 2002 levels by 2050, contingent upon
developed-country assistance. In the run-up to
Copenhagen, Mexico proposed a ‘Green Fund’, a
well-received plan to provide 10 billion US dollars per
year toward mitigation, adaptation, and technology
transfer. And its Copenhagen submission committed
to reduce emissions 51 MMT below business-as-usual
levels by 2012 (equivalent to about a 6.4 percent cut)
and 30 percent below business as usual by 2020
(equivalent to about 250 MMT of carbon dioxide-
equivalent) – see UNFCCC (2010b).5
Mexico has been active at home as well. Its 2009
Special Climate Change Program (PECC) lays out a
number of actions toward meeting its 2012
Copenhagen target, as well as the agencies responsible
for their implementation, the Secretariat of
Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT)
and the National Energy Secretariat (SENER).
Proposed actions include management of landfill gas;
expansion of sustainable forest management, includ-
ing expansion of the payment for environmental ser-
vices scheme; self-supply schemes for renewable ener-
gy; and wind power generation by the Federal
Electricity Commission (CFE).
However, all of Mexico’s ambitious undertakings are
conditioned upon adequate financing from developed
countries.6 And foreseeable funding sources depend at
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least in part on the United States. US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton provided the impetus behind the
USD 100 billion climate change fund promised at
Copenhagen, and the United States will be expected
to make a substantial contribution to this fund. A US
cap-and-trade program with offset and allowance
trading provisions could provide additional financial
incentives for Mexican firms to use cleaner technolo-
gies and production methods. While Mexico might
benefit from selling renewable electricity and carbon
offsets to California, which is implementing climate
change legislation on a far smaller scale, it seems
unlikely that the United States Congress will make cli-
mate change a high priority in the near future. As a
consequence, the United States cannot be counted on
as a key source of funding in the near future.
State
Despite the dismal outlook described above, climate
change regulations cannot be written off just yet.
Action is occurring at the sub-federal level. The
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-
and-trade system for electricity emissions operated by
a group of Northeastern US states, has been active
since September 2008. The RGGI aims to reduce
emissions produced from electricity by 12 percent by
2020. While emissions reductions are not required
until 2015, auctions have been taking place since the
program became active. 
California is creating a cap-and-trade program and
recently released its proposed regulations. This regu-
lation is part of the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI), a group of US states and Canadian provinces
that have promised to reduce their economies’ emis-
sions by 15 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. The
program will cover 85 percent of the state’s emis-
sions and will take effect in 2012 for electricity gen-
erators and large industrial sources and 2015 for
transportation, residential and commercial fuels.
Other parties that do not fall into these categories
can voluntarily opt into the emissions trading pro-
gram (Fickling 2010).
A few Canadian provinces, together comprising
about half of Canada’s emissions, also appear on
track to implement cap-and-trade programs under
the WCI banner by 2012. British Columbia, Que-
bec, and Ontario have all passed bills authorizing
cap-and-trade systems, and British Columbia
released draft regulations in October 2010 (Fickling
2010).
In addition, states have implemented a number of per-
formance standards. One of the most prominent is the
renewable portfolio standard, which requires utilities
to procure a certain percentage of total retail electric-
ity sales from renewable sources. This standard has
been implemented in thirty US states and a handful of
Canadian provinces. Target renewable percentages
range from California’s standard, which aims to meet
a third of the state’s electricity demand though renew-
able resources by 2020, to Texas’s standard, which
requires utilities to procure 5 percent of electricity
from renewable sources by 2015 (Fickling 2010).
Sources that are most often eligible to fulfill state
renewable energy standards include wind, solar,
geothermal, landfill gas, and ocean energy. Hydro-
power, biomass, and municipal solid waste tend to
be given lower priority under a renewable portfolio
standard, if such sources are eligible at all.
Renewable portfolio standards are often combined
with energy efficiency resource standards, which
require utilities to reduce demand through energy
efficiency measures (Fickling 2010).
Another measure that has gained some traction in the
United States is the low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS),
which is currently being piloted by California. The
LCFS is intended to replace the state’s ethanol blend-
ing requirement, which has been criticized for failing
to discriminate between relatively GHG-intensive bio-
fuels such as corn-based ethanol and lower-impact
biofuels such as sugarcane and cellulosic ethanol.
Instead, the LCFS requires the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) to assign a GHG intensity
value to each transport fuel sold in California. 
To obtain these values, CARB must quantify the
GHGs emitted over the lifecycle of a fuel, from the
extraction of the raw materials used to produce the
fuel to the burning of the fuel in one’s car. The
standard then requires fuel retailers to reduce the
GHG intensity of their fuel sales by 10 percent by
2020. Proponents of the standard argue that this
process emphasizes reducing carbon emissions
rather than promoting American corn growers,
although critics argue that CARB uses a flawed
methodology to calculate lifecycle intensity values
(Fickling and Schott 2011).
Trilateral
At least until Canadian Environment Minister Jim
Prentice left office in November 2010, trilateral dia-logue on climate change policy benefited from a close
working relationship among the three environment
ministers, as well as a commitment to trilateral energy
cooperation among heads of state. After nearly a
decade of inaction on climate change policy, the
North American Leaders’ Summit in August 2009
refocused attention on sustainable energy issues and
instructed officials to develop a trilateral working
plan for cooperation on energy science and technolo-
gy. North American environmental ministers also
committed to improving the comparability of data
gathering and inventories for mitigation and adapta-
tion projects at the NAFTA Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) ministerial in
August 2010. 
Bilateral arrangements were also advanced. In
2009, US President Barack Obama and Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper established a Clean
Energy Dialogue to coordinate on carbon capture
and storage research and modernization of the elec-
tric grid. Obama and Mexican President Felipe
Calderon created the US-Mexico Bilateral
Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change,
agreeing to collaborate on low-carbon technology
development and capacity building, as well as adap-
tation to climate change. 
A substantial roadblock is the low level of funding for
climate change activities within NAFTA environmen-
tal institutions. The CEC amasses environmental
information, provides recommendations on trilateral
environmental issues, and promotes environmental
law enforcement – all with a 9 million US dollar bud-
get. The amount of money allocated to the CEC has
remained unchanged since its creation in 1994, despite
inflation and exchange rate movements (the budget is
expressed in dollars, while the CEC is physically locat-
ed in Canada) that have decreased the real value of
this amount. Although the CEC has been effective for
its size, its budget constrains the scope of its opera-
tions (Hufbauer and Schott 2005).
The North American Development Bank (NADB)
and Border Environment Cooperation Commission
(BECC), two interrelated institutions that fund envi-
ronmental projects on the US-Mexico border, receive
far more money in the form of cash and loan guaran-
tees. The capital base of the NADB is 3 billion US
dollars per year (Hufbauer and Schott 2005). Lending
started out far below this capacity due to high interest
rates and a cumbersome application process, but the
NADB/BECC has improved markedly in recent years,
offering subsidized loans to needy communities and
grants from paid-in capital (Kass and McCarroll
2008). Total loans disbursed have skyrocketed from
USD 11 million as of 2002 to USD 1.1 billion as of
September 2010 (NADB 2010). While the scope of
the NADB/BECC has officially expanded to include
renewable energy and energy efficiency, however, these
issues still make up a tiny portion of the institutions’
overall lending portfolio (NADB 2010).
What does this mean for North America? 
State policies are an improvement over no policy.
State environmental regulation has historically served
as a ‘laboratory for innovation’, paving the way for
more stringent federal environmental policy than
would otherwise be adopted and allowing ideas to be
tested on a small scale before they are implemented
nationally. A prominent recent example is California’s
‘Pavley’ automobile tailpipe emissions standards,
which required automakers to achieve a fleet average
fuel efficiency of 36 miles per gallon. After fourteen
other US states and four Canadian provinces adopted
these requirements, the federal governments of the
United States and Canada implemented them on a
national scale. 
However, the fragmentation of climate policy is ideal
neither for the climate nor for the North American
trading system. A robust network of state cap-and-
trade regimes could generate substantial reductions.
But the group of states likely to adopt a cap-and-
trade approach – a handful of Northeastern states
and Canadian provinces, plus California – cannot
produce anything close to the amount of reductions
promised by the United States and Canada in
Copenhagen.
State climate policy is more susceptible to so-called
‘carbon leakage’. Leakage can occur at either the pro-
ducer or the consumer level. Climate change policy
aims to make it more expensive to produce and con-
sume carbon-intensive goods. Because climate policy
is not globally integrated, firms that produce these
goods could simply move to unregulated jurisdictions
rather than reduce their emissions. Likewise, envision
a firm selling two comparable products, one clean and
one dirty, to two places, one with regulations and one
without. The firm could simply sell its dirtier good to
consumers in the unregulated area and its cleaner
good to customers in the regulated area, without nec-
essarily changing its overall production of each good. 
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The extent to which leakage could occur depends
upon a host of factors, including the extent to which
energy prices increase, the energy intensity of in-state
industries, and the ease with which firms can shift
production and sales. States and provinces that are
likely to adopt comprehensive climate change legisla-
tion do not tend to have high concentrations of ener-
gy-intensive, trade-exposed industries. However,
states are particularly economically integrated with
each other, so production and consumption may shift
more easily to unregulated areas than if policy were
adopted at a national level. Modeling of state cap-
and-trade policies produces mixed results as to the
probability of leakage according to RGGI (2007) and
WCI (2008). 
In addition, climate policy that is limited to only a
handful of states and provinces could worsen the
already existent disparities in energy consumption
between leading and laggard regions of North
America. The difference between the GHGs emitted
by California and Wyoming per capita is large, partic-
ularly when it comes to the type of electricity used by
the two states. Carbon-intensive production is also
concentrated in certain states and provinces, particu-
larly in the American Midwest and Southeast and the
western Canadian provinces. These regional differ-
ences already pose frictions for North American poli-
cymakers, who have to construct national climate
change regimes without imposing a disproportionate
economic burden on any one region (Fickling and
Schott 2011). If some states make significant progress
before others catch up, this could exacerbate the diffi-
culty of passing national legislation.
There are difficulties coordinating various state stan-
dards. Whereas some standards such as automobile
and fuel standards are modeled off California’s, oth-
ers such as the renewable portfolio standard are
designed on a state-by-state basis, with little agree-
ment as to what constitutes renewable energy or
where it must come from in order to meet a particu-
lar standard. As a result, it is difficult to trade credits
across regions – even though energy from a different
region might achieve the common goal of reducing
emissions. 
Economies of scale for renewable generation are less
easily captured through state action. When renewable
electricity is generated over a wide area, rather than in
a single locality, it is less susceptible to changes in
weather patterns. States also cannot single-handedly
create the infrastructure necessary to take full advan-
tage of renewable energy. Expanded transmission
would allow renewable electricity to be sold from
areas with high potential to areas with lower poten-
tial. A recent US Department of Energy report points
out that wind power could comprise 20 percent of
national electricity generation if, among other things,
transmission capacity were significantly expanded
(Department of Energy 2008). A smart grid that
moves some electricity usage from peak hours to off-
peak hours can also help ‘soak up’ excess wind power
generated during off-peak hours. Such a project must
be coordinated among many states; one state alone
cannot revamp the current antiquated grid. 
State standards, trade politics and trade law
Recent US federal cap-and-trade proposals included
widely debated measures to protect the competitive-
ness of domestic manufacturing. Most federal legis-
lation introduced after 2007 included a so-called
international reserve allowance program (IRAP),
which required importers to purchase allowances at
the border to compensate for the difference between
the cost of production at home and the cost of pro-
duction in unregulated jurisdictions. The IRAP was
imposed based on country of origin – imports from
countries that had not taken sufficient action on cli-
mate change would be subject to the border measure,
with exceptions only for least developed countries
and de minimis emitters. The measure was a signifi-
cant concern for Canada and Mexico, whose officials
feared that their large volumes of carbon-intensive
exports could be put at risk.7 It was also of question-
able WTO legality.
Even though federal US cap-and-trade legislation is
stalled for the time being, Canada and Mexico are not
off the hook. Carbon tariffs are a response to domes-
tic political pressures from carbon-intensive industries
that anticipated a high cost of reducing emissions and
therefore feared a loss of competitiveness. As noted
above, these pressures were particularly potent
because most carbon-intensive industries are dispro-
portionately concentrated in politically important
states. If these states fall even further behind others 
in reducing emissions, this will both increase the to-
tal amount of emissions that the United States 
must eventually eliminate in order to meet its interna-
tional goals and increase the gap between the cost of
national climate policy to leading states and the cost
7 For more information, see Schott and Fickling (2009).of national climate policy to laggard states. Con-
sequently, protectionist pressures could return with a
vengeance if and when the United States musters the
political will to give cap-and-trade another try. 
Although state legislation avoids some of the frictions
caused by recent national cap-and-trade proposals,
some standards are particularly controversial.
Notably, California’s low carbon fuel standard sepa-
rates petroleum into two categories: ‘conventional’
and ‘unconventional’. Whereas conventional fuels are
all assigned the same lifecycle carbon intensity value
(equivalent to the weighted average carbon intensity
of the fuels consumed in California), unconventional
fuels such as oil sands crude, etc. are given a separate
lifecycle analysis. Unsurprisingly, Canada, which
exports 2.5 million barrels of oil sands crude to the
United States every day, has expressed its concern that
this measure violates WTO rules.8
At issue is whether the distinction between oil sands
crude and conventional crude is arbitrary or justifi-
able. In order to defend its standard before a WTO
dispute settlement panel, California would have to
prove that environmental considerations require oil
sands crude to be treated differently from crude
recovered via conventional drilling processes. The
panel’s decision could hinge upon whether oil sands
crude is sufficiently more GHG-intensive to merit a
separate category. While oil sands crude is about 15
to 20 percent more GHG-intensive than the average
conventional crude to produce and use, the differ-
ence between it and heavier crudes is narrower
(Toman et al. 2008).
Other standards have created somewhat less contro-
versy but have nevertheless proved to be sources of
friction between states and provinces. Some renewable
portfolio standards require qualifying electricity to be
produced in state, or exclude certain sources of elec-
tricity from qualifying as renewable. Many US state
renewable electricity programs have excluded large
hydropower, a decision that United States and
Canada have long disputed (Rowlands 2009).
Ontario’s feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity are
conditioned upon a domestic content requirement of
25 percent for wind turbines and 50 percent for solar
panels. This provision has been challenged in WTO
dispute settlement by Japan, the United States, and
the European Union. Some states also have require-
ments that are transparently engineered to favor 
locally important industries; an example is North
Carolina, which requires utilities to generate a certain
percentage of electricity from swine and poultry waste
(Fickling 2010). 
Conclusion and policy recommendations
While coordinated federal legislation in the United
States, Canada and Mexico would be ideal, this paper
offers some modest steps that the two countries could
take to coordinate state initiatives. The CEC could
function as a clearinghouse for climate change-related
data. With modest budgetary increments, this institu-
tion could play a significant role in NAFTA climate
change initiatives by expanding its database on North
American emissions and reporting on new climate ini-
tiatives and regulations in each country. In so doing,
the CEC could become a North American clearing-
house for monitoring, reporting, and verification
(MRV) of carbon credits issued under provincial or
regional carbon regimes, which could lower transac-
tion costs of offset projects among the three North
American countries. The scope of the NADB could
also be expanded to include more projects related to
clean energy and energy efficiency.
States and provinces are already discussing the possi-
bility of mutual recognition of carbon credits gener-
ated by various regional cap-and-trade schemes, and
they should continue to study options for coordinat-
ing or integrating these evolving carbon regimes.
Policy coordination could facilitate carbon credit
trading by ensuring that carbon credits in all jurisdic-
tions represent similar kinds of carbon reductions. In
addition, greater coordination among carbon trading
regimes could help address concerns regarding ‘car-
bon leakage’ that have plagued the implementation of
cap-and-trade programs in many states.
Somewhat more controversially, states and provinces
may work toward coordinated renewable electricity
policies. All parties should agree on how imported
electricity should be credited and certified under
renewable portfolio standards, both at the federal and
state levels. To the extent feasible, states and provinces
should harmonize definitions of renewable electricity
in order to stimulate development by increasing the
fungibility of RECs. Harmonization and expansion
of renewable energy credit tracking systems could
also widen the geographic area from which renewable
credits could be purchased. 
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The North American countries should shield climate
change taxes and regulations from claims under the
indirect takings provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11.
Chapter 11 requires governments to provide com-
pensation to investors for measures that are ‘tanta-
mount to expropriation’. To date, Chapter 11 cases
have assumed a limited scope for environmental
laws’ constituting expropriation. Climate change
laws will most likely have much broader economic
effects than prior environmental legislation, and the
scope of potential claims under NAFTA Chapter 11
due to climate change laws and regulations could be
orders of magnitude greater than those filed in the
past. The potential for such Chapter 11 litigation
against climate change laws could slow the imple-
mentation of measures designed to mitigate GHG
emissions and adversely flows of trade and invest-
ment in the region. 
These measures would increase the efficiency of state
and regional climate change regulations. However,
they are no substitute for a comprehensive national
approach to climate change in both countries. In
order to ensure the best policy outcome, Obama and
Harper should work toward a national cap-and-trade
or carbon tax bill. 
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